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Criminal Law
by John A. Regan*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews some of the most important opinions impacting
the practice of criminal law delivered by the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Georgia Supreme Court covering the period of
June 1, 2018 up until May 31, 2019, as well as legislation adopted by
the Georgia General Assembly during the 2019 Session. 1 This Article is
designed to be a mere overview to both prosecutors and defense
attorneys of decisions and new statutes and serves as a broad guideline
to how these decisions will affect their practices.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Although the Supreme Court has delivered multiple decisions during
the term, two decisions are covered in this Article. The first, Carpenter
v. United States,2 dealt with whether a person’s cell-site information
was subject to a search warrant. In Bucklew v. Precythe,3 the Court
again considered the death penalty and the Eighth Amendment.
In Carpenter, the issue was whether the government was required to
get a search warrant requiring probable cause rather than a court order
under the Stored Communications Act 4 to obtain the cell phone records
they were after.5 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts
overturned the lower court’s ruling that “[a] person does not surrender
all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.
To the contrary, ‘what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
*State Gang Resource Prosecutor, Prosecuting Attorneys Council of Georgia. Former
Assistant District Attorney, Macon Judicial Circuit. Wake Forest University (B.A., cum
laude, 1998); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2001). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. See Bernadette C. Crucilla, Criminal Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 70
MERCER L. REV. 63 (2018) for an analysis of criminal law during the prior survey period.
2. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (5–4 decision) (Roberts, C.J.).
3. 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (5–4 decision) (Gorsuch, J.).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2019).
5. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2212.
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area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.’” 6 He
further went on to say that
[a]llowing government access to cell-site records contravenes that
expectation. Although such records are generated for commercial
purposes, that distinction does not negate Carpenter’s anticipation of
privacy in his physical location . . . . [T]racking is remarkably easy,
cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With
just the click of a button, the Government can access each carrier’s
deep repository of historical location information at practically no
expense.7

As such, the government’s actions were determined to be a violation
of the Fourth Amendment and set the precedent that getting cell-site
records required a search warrant requiring probable cause, not merely
executing a court order showing no probable cause, and the conviction
of Carpenter was overturned on a 5–4 decision, with Roberts siding
with the “liberal” wing of the Court: Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan.8
In Bucklew, the defendant was convicted of a brutal murder,
kidnapping, and rape of his ex-girlfriend and was sentenced to death in
Missouri.9 Two weeks before his scheduled execution, he raised an
argument that due to his unique medical condition, the way Missouri
executed prisoners, the same way Georgia does, using the drug
Pentobarbital, would produce excruciating pain and, as such, violate the
Eighth Amendment. The defendant offered an alternative for his
execution, the use of “lethal gas” using nitrogen, but this method has
never been used by any state to carry out an execution. 10 In delivering
the opinion of the Court, Justice Gorsuch disagreed with Bucklew. He
stated that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a prisoner a
painless death and noted that this was a right most victims of capital
crimes were denied.11 Rather, “what unites the punishments the Eighth
Amendment was understood to forbid, and distinguishes them from
those it was understood to allow, is that the former were long disused
(unusual) forms of punishment that intensified the sentence of death

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 2217 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)).
Id. at 2217–18.
Id. at 2223.
Bucklew, 139 S.Ct. at 1116, 1119.
Id. at 1120–21.
Id. at 1124.
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with a (cruel) ‘superadd[ition]’ of ‘terror, pain, or disgrace.’” 12 Justice
Gorsuch also went on to state that
the surviving victims of Mr. Bucklew’s crimes, and others like them
deserve better. Even the principal dissent acknowledges that ‘the
long delays that now typically occur between the time an offender is
sentenced to death and his execution’ are ‘excessive.’ The answer is
not, as the dissent incongruously suggests, to reward those who
interpose delay with a decree ending capital punishment by judicial
fiat.13

This decision impacts Georgia because, as previously stated, the
method of execution used in Missouri is the same used by our
Department of Corrections. As such, the decision in Bucklew will have
an impact on death sentences imposed in Georgia.
III. GEORGIA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
To convict a person of statutory rape in Georgia, there must be some
evidence that corroborates the victim’s testimony that the defendant
committed the crime alleged.14 In Atkins v. State,15 the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled that a complainant’s prior consistent statement
could not provide the corroborating evidence required to support the
conviction, overturning several opinions that had been delivered by the
Georgia Court of Appeals.16 In delivering the opinion of the court,
Justice Melton stated,
The value of a prior consistent statement is that it does not differ
from a subsequent statement. The consistency of a prior statement of
the statutory rape victim makes a subsequent statement that
contains the same details more believable. On the other hand,
corroborating evidence earns its value because it is independent from
the victim’s statement. It is evidence from an independent source
that supports the conclusion that the defendant committed the
statutory rape of the victim. For this fundamental reason, a prior
statement by a victim is not, by definition or otherwise, corroborating
evidence that the statutory rape occurred.17

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008)).
Id. at 1134 (quoting Breyer, J., dissenting).
O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3(a) (2019).
304 Ga. 240, 818 S.E.2d 567 (2018).
Atkins, 304 Ga. at 240, 243–44, 818 S.E.2d at 569–71.
Id. at 244, 818 S.E.2d at 571 (emphasis omitted).
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Justice Melton’s ruling also cited to Georgia’s new evidence code,
adopted in 2013, in that a witness cannot corroborate his or her own
statement.18
In deciding Willis v. State,19 the Georgia Supreme Court took up the
argument about whether or not a defendant was presumptively harmed
by a trial judge’s erroneous failure to excuse a prospective juror for
cause simply because the defendant subsequently elected to remove
that juror through the use of a peremptory strike. The decision,
authored by Justice Benham, was that the defendant was not
overruling several cases,20 including Fortson v. State21 and Harris v.
State.22 In delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Benham based his
decision on the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in United States
v. Martinez-Salazar23 and the dissent in Fortson v. State. Citing the
dissent in Fortson, Justice Benham stated,
“[T]he mere exhaustion or waste of peremptory strikes should not
dictate that a given action regarding a disqualified juror is either
invariably harmless or necessarily harmful. Instead, the focus under
current Georgia law should be on whether any unqualified juror was
seated as the ultimate result of errors with respect to jurors
challenged for cause.”24

In finally overruling Fortson, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that
a defendant is not presumptively harmed by a trial court’s erroneous
failure to excuse a prospective juror for cause simply because the
defendant subsequently elected to remove that juror through the use
of a peremptory strike. Instead, such a defendant must show on
appeal that one of the challenged jurors who served on his or her
twelve-person jury was unqualified.25

The Georgia Supreme Court also addressed the issue of newly
discovered evidence in a defendant’s motion for new trial in Jackson v.

18. Id. at 244 n.1, 820 S.E.2d at 571 n.1 (citing O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8 (2019)).
19. 304 Ga. 686, 820 S.E.2d 640 (2018).
20. Id. at 700–02, 820 S.E.2d at 654–55.
21. 277 Ga. 164, 587 S.E.2d 39 (2003).
22. 255 Ga. 464, 339 S.E.2d 712 (1986).
23. 528 U.S. 304, 317 (2000) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J.) (ruling that a defendant who
exercises a peremptory strike on a juror to remove a judge’s error suffers no harm and is
not derived of a constitutional right).
24. Willis, 304 Ga. at 705, 820 S.E.2d at 657 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fortson, 277
Ga. at 170, 587 S.E.2d at 44 (Carley, J., dissenting)).
25. Id. at 707, 820 S.E.2d at 659.
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State.26 In denying the defendant’s claim for a new trial based on new
evidence, Justice Peterson ruled, citing to the factors established under
Timberlake v. State,27 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a motion for new trial. 28 In Jackson, the appellant brought
forward a new witness named McGlotha who alleged to have been
present at a murder and presented testimony that appellant was not
present at the murder.29 The supreme court, in upholding the lower
court, determined that
[i]mplicit in the trial court’s evaluation of the diligence used to
procure McGlotha’s testimony was a finding that one of two things
was true: either (1) McGlotha actually was present near the scene of
the crime on the night in question, in which case Appellant could
have secured his presence for trial had he exercised proper diligence;
or (2) McGlotha was not present at the scene as he claimed and thus
his testimony was not credible. The finding that the defense would
have discovered McGlotha was a witness in time for trial had he
actually been present at the scene is not an unreasonable one.30

Perhaps one of the most impactful decisions the supreme court
delivered during this past year was the decision in Elliott v. State,31
dealing with a defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath test in a driving
under the influence case. The question before the court was whether
that violated the right against self-incrimination. The court had
previously held in Olevik v. State32 that someone suspected of driving
under the influence could not be forced into submitting to a chemical
breath test under Georgia’s Constitution. 33 The question in Elliott

26. 304 Ga. 827, 822 S.E.2d 198 (2018).
27. 246 Ga. 488, 491, 271 S.E.2d 792, 795–96 (1980) (establishing a six-factor test to
grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The party asking for a new trial
must show that: (1) the evidence has come to his/her knowledge since the trial; (2) it was
not owing to the want of due diligence that he/she did not acquire it sooner; (3) the
evidence is so material that it probably would produce a different verdict; (4) the evidence
is not merely cumulative; (5) the affidavit of the witness himself/herself has been
procured or its absence accounted for; and (6) impeaching the credibility of a witness will
not be the only effect of the evidence. All six requirements must be met in order to secure
a new trial.).
28. Jackson, 304 Ga. at 831, 822 S.E.2d at 201–02.
29. Id. at 830, 822 S.E.2d at 201.
30. Id. at 831, 822 S.E.2d at 202.
31. 305 Ga. 179, 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019).
32. 302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505, 508–09 (2017) (holding that the Georgia
Constitution’s, not the United States Constitution’s, right against self-incrimination
prevented the State from forcing a person to submit to a chemical breath test).
33. Id. at 228–29, 806 S.E.2d at 509.
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became whether or not the court would expand on Olevik and include a
person’s right to not have the refusal of said test held against them. The
facts that gave rise to Elliott involved a woman stopped in Clarke
County after the officer observed several traffic violations. Elliott
admitted to having consumed alcohol earlier in the day and performed a
standardized field sobriety test that showed several signs of
impairment.34 She was arrested and read the statutorily mandated
implied consent notice.35 She refused the testing, was taken to jail, and
at trial filed a motion to suppress the refusal under Georgia’s
Constitution and Georgia Code.36 Justice Peterson’s decision expanded
the holding in Olevik and held that the Georgia Constitution, not the
United States Constitution, protects citizens from having a refusal to
submit to chemical testing held against them in a court of law. 37 The
court reasoned,
This Court cannot change the Georgia Constitution, even if we
believe there may be good policy reasons for doing so; only the
General Assembly and the people of Georgia may do that. And this
Court cannot rewrite statutes. This decision may well have
implications for the continuing validity of the implied consent notice
as applied to breath tests, but revising that notice is a power
reserved to the General Assembly. Having considered the text of
Paragraph XVI and the context in which it was enacted, as well as all
of the arguments made by the parties and the amici, we conclude
that Paragraph XVI precludes admission of evidence that a suspect
refused to consent to a breath test. Consequently, we conclude that
O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-67.1 (b) and 40-6-392 (d) are unconstitutional to the
34. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 180–81, 824 S.E.2d at 268.
35. Id. at 181, 824 S.E.2d at 268; O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(b)(2) (2018). The language of
the implied consent notice for drivers aged 21 years or older (as was Elliott) read as
follows:
Georgia law requires you to submit to state administered chemical tests of your
blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining
if you are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing,
your Georgia driver’s license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state
will be suspended for a minimum period of one year. Your refusal to submit to
the required testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial. If you
submit to testing and the results indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.08
grams or more, your Georgia driver’s license or privilege to drive on the
highways of this state may be suspended for a minimum period of one year.
After first submitting to the required state tests, you are entitled to additional
chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances at your
own expense and from qualified personnel of your own choosing. Will you
submit to the state administered chemical tests of your (designate which tests)
under the implied consent law?
36. Elliott, 305 Ga. at 181, 824 S.E.2d at 268.
37. Id. at 223, 824 S.E.2d at 296.
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extent that they allow a defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath test
to be admitted into evidence at a criminal trial.38

The ramifications and response by the Georgia General Assembly to
the Elliott decision will be addressed further in the General Assembly
section of this Article.
Following on the heels of the Elliott decision, the Georgia Supreme
Court delivered the decision in State v. Turnquest,39 ruling that law
enforcement was not required to read the Miranda40 warnings to a
person in custody prior to asking them to submit to a breath test. 41 The
case arose after defendant Turnquest was arrested for driving under
the influence following a single-vehicle accident and was read the
appropriate Georgia implied consent notice, as was the case in Elliott,
but not the Miranda warnings whereabout he gave a breath sample. 42
The court held Miranda does not apply to a request for a breath test,
however, because affirmative acts such as submitting to a breath test do
not fall within the reach of the right against compelled
self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment. 43 The court then
looked to see if Turnquest’s argument turned on some element of
Georgia law requiring law enforcement to give a suspect in custody
Miranda-like warnings before asking the suspect to consent to a breath
test.44 The court considered several possible Georgia-law sources for
such a requirement. As Justice Peterson wrote,
Turnquest explicitly relies on Paragraph XVI in support of his
argument that warnings were required. We also consider the due
process provision of the Georgia Constitution, found at Article I,
Section, I, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983
(“Paragraph I”), given that due process also is implicated in questions
of whether incriminating statements or acts were constitutionally
acquired by law enforcement and may be at least one basis for the
Miranda rule. And the trial court relied at least in part on former
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-20 (a), now O.C.G.A. § 24-5-506 (a), so we consider
that statute as a possible source, as well. We ultimately conclude
that none of these provisions of Georgia law require law enforcement

38. Id.
39. 305 Ga. 758, 827 S.E.2d at 865 (2019).
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. Turnquest, 305 Ga. at 758, 827 S.E.2d 868.
42. Id. at 759, 827 S.E.2d at 868.
43. Id. at 760, 827 S.E.2d at 869 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221–23
(1967); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910); and Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 760–65 (1966)).
44. Id.
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to warn persons in custody of any constitutional rights before asking
them to submit to a breath test.45

In doing so, the court overruled Price v. State,46 a case which held
that failure to give Miranda warnings rendered evidence regarding field
sobriety tests inadmissible because a person was in custody when asked
to perform them.47
Another landmark decision over the past year, State v. Rosenbaum,48
dealt with searches of electronic devices initially seized in a warrantless
but lawful manner by law enforcement. At issue were a laptop, iPhones,
and an iPad taken during the arrest of Jennifer and Joseph Rosenbaum
for the death of their two-year-old foster child, Laila Daniel, and alleged
physical abuse of their second foster child, M.P., the biological sister of
Laila. The electronics in question were seized at the time of the
defendants’ arrest without a warrant and law enforcement eventually
obtained search warrants for the items, but not until 539 days had
elapsed with other search warrants not issued until 702 days after the
initial seizure. The reason for the delay in the search was the result of
the police department failing to disclose to the District Attorney’s Office
the existence of seized electronics, and upon learning of said seizure,
the prosecutor did seek and obtain search warrants, but not until 536
days had passed since the initial seizure.49 On February 27, 2018, the
trial court initially suppressed the search as a violation of the
defendants’ Fourth Amendment right to unreasonable search and
seizure under the analysis employed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 50 Upon beginning its review, the
supreme court applied three fundamental principles in its analysis:

45. Id. at 760–61, 827 S.E.2d at 869 (citation omitted).
46. 269 Ga. 222, 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998).
47. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 774–75, 827 S.E.2d at 878–79. The court stated
Accordingly, we overrule Price and other Georgia appellate decisions to the
extent that they hold that either O.C.G.A. § 24-5-506 (a) or the Georgia
Constitution requires law enforcement to warn suspects in custody of their
right to refuse to perform an incriminating act. We also disapprove language in
other decisions that is inconsistent with our holding in this case. Because the
trial court’s ruling suppressing the results of Turnquest’s breath test relied on
Price, we vacate that ruling.
Id.
48. 305 Ga. 442, 826 S.E.2d 18 (2019).
49. Id. at 442–44, 826 S.E.2d at 20–22.
50. Id. at 446, 826 S.E.2d at 23 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347,
1350–51 (11th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 613–14 (11th Cir.
2012)).
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First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that
judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and
his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the
verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if
there is any evidence to support [them]. Second, the trial court’s
decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be
accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must
construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial
court’s findings and judgment. On numerous occasions the appellate
courts of this state have invoked these three principles to affirm trial
court rulings that upheld the validity of seizures. These same
principles of law apply equally to trial court rulings that are in favor
of the defendant.51

The court went on to point out that this was a case of first
impression, but the issue had been addressed extensively by the
Eleventh Circuit.52
Justice Boggs, in upholding the decision of the trial court and
agreeing to the suppression of the search on Fourth Amendment
grounds, wrote:
The trial court found that the duration of the delay in this case
“weighed strongly in favor of the Defendants.” Here, the delay
between seizure of the devices and searches of their contents
pursuant to the warrants was significantly longer than the delay in
cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit and cases from other circuits
upon which the Eleventh Circuit and the trial court relied. The State
in its appellate brief cites several additional cases, but none involved
so lengthy a delay, and the circumstances underlying the delays
differ substantially from those presented in the case before us.
Moreover, in each of those cases, the trial court made the fact-specific
determination that the delay was reasonable. In contrast, in cases
involving no earlier warrant, consent, or agreement under a
probation order, and no other extenuating factors such as complexity
of investigation, lack of manpower, or other showing of police
diligence justifying delay, the delay complained of is measured in
days or weeks—rather than months.
The State claims that the trial court erred in “tucking away” the
analysis of the State’s conduct into the Laist delay factor. That
contention is without merit. The trial court considered the State’s
conduct both in its analysis of delay and at the conclusion of its

51. Id. at 449, 826 S.E.2d at 25 (citing Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286, 286–87, 702
S.E.2d 888, 889–90 (2010)).
52. Id.
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analysis. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit in Laist was not as
methodical in its approach as the trial court was in the order before
us, and it followed no strict sequence in its consideration of the four
factors, once it outlined them. But it is apparent that the Laist court
considered the diligence of the police in the context of possible factors
contributing to the delay in obtaining a warrant–including the scope
of the investigation and complexity of the warrant, the personnel
available, and conflicting demands on the investigators’ time, see
[Laist,] 702 F.3d at 614—and concluded that the delay was not
caused by lack of diligence on part of the police.
Here, in contrast, the State made no showing of particular
complexity, difficulty in drafting the warrant, or competing demands
on a limited number of officers. Instead, the trial court found
multiple errors, failures, and oversights on the part of the State with
respect to investigating or even accounting for the devices. Despite
the specific listing of each device in the property booking sheets
attached to separate reports by Officer Butera and Detective
Harrison, which Detective Thompson acknowledged he had in his file
but did not read, and despite requests by appellees and at least one
direct request to the property and evidence room, police
“inexplicably” did not find the devices in their own property and
evidence room until after the May 23, 2017 hearing, although the
devices had been there since the time of appellees’ arrest in 2015.
The trial court’s conclusion that “the State did not diligently pursue
its investigation as it relates to the content of these devices” is amply
supported by the record.53

As such, the delay in the searches was ruled to be a violation of the
defendants’ Fourth Amendment right and the searches of their
electronic devices seized without a warrant were held inadmissible. 54
Justice Boggs went on further, noting,
The circumstances here more closely resemble those in Burgard, [] in
which the Seventh Circuit determined that the Leon good-faith
exception would not apply to an unreasonable delay in obtaining a
search warrant, observing that “[a] well-trained officer is presumed
to be aware that a seizure must last no longer than reasonably
necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain a warrant.
When police fail to act with such diligence, exclusion will typically be
the appropriate remedy.” The Seventh Circuit also noted:

53. Id. at 452–554, 826 S.E.2d at 27–28 (footnote omitted) (citing Laist, 702 F.3d 608
(11th Cir. 2012)).
54. Id. at 454–55, 826 S.E.2d at 28.
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Furthermore, removing this sort of police misconduct from the
ambit of the exclusionary rule would have significant
implications: it would eliminate the rule’s deterrent effect on
unreasonably long seizures. Police could seize any item—a
phone, a computer, a briefcase, or even a house—for an
unreasonably long time without concern for the consequences,
evidentiary and otherwise.55

The supreme court also considered the constitutionality of requiring
a sex offender to wear a GPS monitoring device for life, despite not
being on probation or parole.56 In Park v. State,57 the court first
considered whether the statute amounted to a search under the Fourth
Amendment, which the court held it did.58 Once determining that the
statute was in fact a search, the court then consider whether said
search was in fact reasonable.59 Justice Melton in his opinion ruled it
was not and held the statute unconstitutional. 60 He wrote,

55. Id. at 456, 826 S.E.2d at 29 (quoting United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029,
1035 (7th Cir. 2012)).
56. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e) (2019) states:
Any sexually dangerous predator shall be required to wear an electronic
monitoring system that shall have, at a minimum: (1) The capacity to locate
and record the location of a sexually dangerous predator by a link to a global
positioning satellite system; (2) The capacity to timely report or record a
sexually dangerous predator’s presence near or within a crime scene or in a
prohibited area or the sexually dangerous predator’s departure from specific
geographic locations; and (3) An alarm that is automatically activated and
broadcasts the sexually dangerous predator’s location if the global positioning
satellite monitor is removed or tampered with by anyone other than a law
enforcement official designated to maintain and remove or replace the
equipment.
Such electronic monitoring system shall be worn by a sexually dangerous
predator for the remainder of his or her natural life. The sexually dangerous
predator shall pay the cost of such system to the Department of Community
Supervision if the sexually dangerous predator is under probation or parole
supervision and to the sheriff after the sexually dangerous predator completes
his or her term of probation and parole or if the sexually dangerous predator
has moved to this state from another state, territory, or country. The electronic
monitoring system shall be placed upon the sexually dangerous predator prior
to his or her release from confinement. If the sexual offender is not in custody,
within 72 hours of the decision classifying the sexual offender as a sexually
dangerous predator in accordance with subsection (b) of this Code section, the
sexually dangerous predator shall report to the sheriff of the county of his or
her residence for purposes of having the electronic monitoring system placed
on the sexually dangerous predator.
57. 305 Ga. 348, 825 S.E.2d 147 (2019).
58. Id. at 348, 825 S.E.2d at 150.
59. Id. at 351–52, 825 S.E.2d at 152.
60. Id. at 360–61, 825 S.E.2d at 158.
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We find such searches to be patently unreasonable, and therefore
conclude that [O.C.G.A.] § 42-1-14 (e) is unconstitutional on its face
to the extent that it authorizes such searches of individuals, like
Park, who are no longer serving any part of their sentences in order
to find evidence of possible criminal conduct.61

IV. GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECISIONS
In response to the decisions in Elliott and Turnquest, the 2019
session of the Georgia General Assembly saw a quick reaction to the
supreme court’s decision. The response was in the form of House Bill
471,62 which altered Georgia’s implied consent statute under O.C.G.A.
§ 40-5-67.1.63 Governor Brian Kemp signed the legislation into law on
April 29, 2019, which replaced the previous warnings for drivers under
twenty-one, over twenty-one, and those operating commercial motor
vehicles with the following language:
(b) At the time a chemical test or tests are requested, the arresting
officer shall select and read to the person the appropriate implied
consent notice from the following:
(1) Implied consent notice for suspects under age 21:
“The State of Georgia has conditioned your privilege to drive upon
the highways of this state upon your submission to state
administered chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other
bodily substances for the purpose of determining if you are under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing, your Georgia
driver’s license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state will
be suspended for a minimum period of one year. Your refusal to
submit to blood or urine testing may be offered into evidence against
you at trial. If you submit to testing and the results indicate an
alcohol concentration of 0.02 grams or more, your Georgia driver’s
license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state may be
suspended for a minimum period of one year. After first submitting
to the requested state tests, you are entitled to additional chemical
tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances at your
own expense and from qualified personnel of your own choosing. Will
you submit to the state administered chemical tests of your
(designate which test)?”
(2) Implied consent notice for suspects age 21 or over:
61. Id.
62. Ga. H.R. Bill 471, Reg. Sess. (2019) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 27-3-7, 40-5-67.1, and
52-7-12.5 (2019)).
63. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1 (2019).
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“The State of Georgia has conditioned your privilege to drive upon
the highways of this state upon your submission to state
administered chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other
bodily substances for the purpose of determining if you are under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing, your Georgia
driver’s license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state will
be suspended for a minimum period of one year. Your refusal to
submit to blood or urine testing may be offered into evidence against
you at trial. If you submit to testing and the results indicate an
alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or more, your Georgia driver’s
license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state may be
suspended for a minimum period of one year. After first submitting
to the requested state tests, you are entitled to additional chemical
tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances at your
own expense and from qualified personnel of your own choosing. Will
you submit to the state administered chemical tests of your
(designate which test)?”
(3) Implied consent notice for commercial motor vehicle driver
suspects: “The State of Georgia has conditioned your privilege to
drive upon the highways of this state upon your submission to state
administered chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other
bodily substances for the purpose of determining if you are under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing, you will be
disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a
minimum period of one year. Your refusal to submit to blood or urine
testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial. If you
submit to testing and the results indicate the presence of any alcohol,
you will be issued an out of service order and will be prohibited from
operating a commercial motor vehicle for 24 hours. If the results
indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.04 grams or more, you will be
disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a
minimum period of one year. After first submitting to the requested
state tests, you are entitled to additional chemical tests of your blood,
breath, urine, or other bodily substances at your own expense and
from qualified personnel of your own choosing. Will you submit to the
state administered chemical tests of your (designate which test)?”64

V. CONCLUSION
These decisions are just a handful of the cases that will impact
criminal law in Georgia. The law is always in a state of flux, which
requires prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys alike to always be
aware of the cases granted certiorari by the courts and be aware of the

64. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(b)(1)–(3) (2019). See Ga. H.R. Bill 471, Reg. Sess. (2019).
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impact their decisions will have on the cases argued across this state
and country for years to come. So too will the laws passed by the
General Assembly affect the way criminal cases are handled by
Georgia’s courts.

